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In the course of his Inquiry into the Human Mind, first 
published in 1764, Thomas Reid developed the elements of a doubly 
elliptical "geometry of visibles" more than half a century before 
Gauss, Lobatchewsky, and Bolyai published their earliest works 
on non-Euclidean geometries. Norman Daniels provides here a 
rational reconstruction of Reid's accomplishment which purports 
to show (1) that Reid really did discover a non-Euclidean geometry 
and not merely a spherical geometry applicable to curved lines 
in Euclidean space, (2) that his discovery emerged quite logically 
out of an eighteenth-century tradition of research on visual 
perception interacting with a philosophical tradition which was 
interested in supporting a "realist" metaphysics against the 
"idealism" of the British empiricist school of Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume, (3) the context of Reid's discovery explains why it 
did not inform the later "mathematical" tradition of non-Euclidean 
geometries, and (4) that the arguments surrounding the geometry 
of visibles did, however, constitute an effective attack upon 
idealist theories of concept formation which deserves consider- 
ation by serious philosophers. 
Given his program, the author has done a masterful job. The 
presentation is intelligent, lucid, coherent, and in almost all 
instances convincing. Paradoxically, it is the very lucidity and 
coherence of Daniels' analysis that troubles me most as an his- 
torian. Reid's own discussion of the geometry of visibles and 
objects of geometry is frequently less lucid and certainly less 
coherent than Daniels' historical reconstruction. To clarify 
Reid's arguments is admirable, but to paraphase them using ana- 
lytic notions foreign to Reid and in such a way as to hide Reid's 
ambiguities is to distort the historical situation. 
I would have been much happier with Daniels' treatment if 
he had presented Reid's wording of arguments and then offered 
his interpretive paraphrases and analyses; so that the reader 
could better judge what in Daniels' account is descriptive and 
what is interpretive. Moreover, I would have been happier if 
Daniels' selections from Reid had been more representative of 
his inconsistencies and ambiguities. Let me offer just two 
examples to illustrate my point. In discussing his contention 
that Reid was not mereiy presenting a spherical geometry to cover 
curved lines in Euclidean space, but an autonomous non-Euclidean 
geometry, Daniels quite properly cites Reid's comment that cer- 
tain propositions regarding visible figure "are not less true 
nor less evident than the propositions of Euclid with regard to 
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tangible figure,” even though they contradict Definition 23 and 
Postulate 1 of Euclid’s Elements. From this we are plausibly 
invited to infer that “vision and touch reveal to us different 
real sets of relations” (p. xvi). Many of Reid’s comments do 
suggest that spherical projective geometry over Euclidean space 
serves only as a model for the two dimensional “geometry Of 
visibles. ” Yet Daniels does not present us with the following 
passage in which Reid suggests a rather different interpretation 
--i.e., that the geometry of visibles is not merely modeled by, 
but is constituted by spherical geometry in Euclidean space. 
Supposing external objects to exist, and to have 
the tangible extension and figure which we perceive, 
it follows demonstrably, from the principle now 
mentioned, that their visible extension and figure 
must be just what we see it to be. 
The rules of perspective, and of the projection 
of the sphere, which is a branch of perspective, are 
demonstrable. They suppose the existence of external 
objects, which have a tangible extension and figure; 
and upon that supposition, they demonstrate what 
must be the visible extension and figure of such 
objects, when placed in such a position and at such 
a distance. 
Hence, it is evident that the visible figure 
and extension of objects is so far from being 
incompatible with the tangible [i.e. Euclidean], 
that the first is a necessary consequence from the 
last . . . [Hamilton 1863, 3261. 
From this point of view there is no incompatibility between 
visible and tactile figure and extension. Thus Reid seems to 
back away from his earlier position. 
Similarly, although Daniels quite correctly focuses on 
Reid’s argument that the objects of geometry and concepts which 
are neither sensations nor tied to special sensations, he fails 
to note inconsistent statements in which Reid refers to extension 
and figure as qualities whose “nature is manifest to our senses” 
[ibid., 3151. 
In sum, Daniels reflects very well the major thrust and 
importance of Reid’s work, but he portrays Reid as a more system- 
atic and consistent thinker than he was. 
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